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This report from the Polish jurisdiction will focus on the 
legally and socially most significant developments in civil liability 
law, more specifically in the field of personal injury law, which 
took place after the political-economic change in 1990.  
Polish personal injury law embraces rules that are contained in 
the part of the civil code (kodeks cywilny,1 hereinafter k.c.) 
governing torts as well as in some other special legislation. 
Contrary to referring to the subject matter of the rules as “personal 
injury law,” as American lawyers do, Polish lawyers refer to these 
on “reparation or compensation of damage to person.” 
Compensation is possible only when the claim is sought in the tort 
regime. However, under the principle of concurrence of liabilities, 
if the breach can be qualified as a tort, the victim who suffered 
damage arising from a breach of contract may choose the tort 
regime in order to seek compensation for personal injuries.  
After a short introduction to the historical underpinnings of 
Polish civil law and a brief description of Polish tort rules and 
remedies, this article presents the topic of damages in cases of 
personal injury law in light of its development by courts after 
1990. Some of the most important legislative changes, spurred by 
the demand of legal practitioners, are then presented. Both 
substantive law and procedural law changes will be discussed. 
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLISH PRIVATE LAW AND 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH LEGAL TRADITION 
Polish private law is a “hybrid civil legal system”—a system in 
which there were developed uniform solutions superseding the first 
classical European civil codes, like the French civil code (Code 
Napoléon), the Austrian civil code (ABGB) of 1711 and the 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  Professor of Law, Chair of Civil Law, Gdansk University, Poland, 
member of the European Group on Tort Law. 
 1. Act of 23 April 1964, Kodeks Cywilny [Civil Code], Dziennik Ustaw 
[Dz.U.] 1964, no. 16, item 93 as later amended. 
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German civil code (BGB) of 1896.2 Until 1795 Polish civil law 
was mainly customary and under very limited influence of Roman 
law, which was considered as limiting the privileges of nobility.3 
After three partitions of the Republic of Poland by the Russian, 
Prussian and Austrian Empires (1772, 1793 and 1795, 
respectively), the Polish state ceased existing for 123 years. During 
the time of partition, the whole of the Polish territory was under 
the influence of five legal systems: the ABGB, the Code Napoléon, 
the Prussian civil code (later replaced by the BGB), the Collection 
of Laws of the Russian Empire (volume X) of 1835, and 
Hungarian law (in the small southern parts of Poland—Spiš and 
Orava). All of the above were official sources of law in the 
territory of Poland.4 The Duchy of Warsaw, created in 1807 by 
Napoléon, formally adopted his code civil as its general civil law in 
1808. The code also continued to be binding law in the semi-
independent Congress of Poland (1815-1832).5 Cultural and 
political ties with France were to a great extent influenced by the 
continental exploits and legend of Napoléon. The reception of the 
Code Napoléon in toto serves as a great example of the reception 
of a foreign legal system. Polish doctrinal views were strongly 
influenced both by the general ideas of the Code Napoléon and by 
                                                                                                             
 2. See Wojciech Dajczak, The Polish way to a unified law of contract – 
local curiosity or contribution to the European debate today? in DEUTSCHLAND 
UND POLEN IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 13-24 (Chr. v. Bar & 
A. Wudarski eds., Sellier European Law Pubs 2012). 
 3. See Wojciech Dajczak, Historical development of private law in Poland 
in HANDBOOK OF POLISH LAW 42-43 (W. Dajczak, A. J. Szwarc & P. Wiliński 
eds., Szkolne PWN 2011). 
 4. See EWA BAGIŃSKA & MAGDALENA TULIBACKA, POLAND in 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: TORT LAW, nos. 3-4 (I. Boone ed., 
Kluwer Law Int’l 2014). 
 5. Established in 1807, the Duchy of Warsaw was subordinated to France. 
Napoleon ordered the application there of the liberal constitution and the French 
civil code of 1804; whereas the Congress (Kingdom of) Poland created at the 
Congress in Vienna (1815) was under the Russian regime, its civil law remained 
French civil law until 1964, with the modification of mortgage law in 1818 
(replacing title XVIII of the Code Napoléon), as well as personal and 
matrimonial law that were replaced in 1925 with the Civil Code of the Congress 
of Poland. For more detail, see Dajczak, Historical development of private law 
in Poland, supra note 3, at 43-44. 
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the French judiciary. French commentaries and case law were 
translated into Polish, which facilitated the proliferation of French 
law in Poland. The Code Napoléon is regarded as an element 
inseparable from the Polish system of civil law.6 
As the three codes (Code Napoléon, ABGB and BGB) 
commonly derived from the Roman law tradition, Polish private 
law eventually became a civilian country as well. The Roman 
tradition is the main reason why the Polish law of obligations 
followed both the ideas of the French Code Napoléon and the 
Germanic legal culture.7 
When Poland regained its independence in 1918, substantial 
legal reforms were undertaken immediately. The Polish 
Codification Commission first codified the law of obligations in 
the code of obligations of 1933 (kodeks zobowiazan, hereinafter 
k.z.), borrowing many elements of the regulation from the then-
most modern Swiss code of obligations of 1911, as well as from 
the French-Italian draft civil code of 1927.8 The codification also 
embraced commercial law (the code of commercial companies of 
1934), private international law, the law on bills of exchange and 
cheques, the law on unfair competition, and the copyright law.  
In 1964, the code of obligations (kodeks zobowiazan, k.z.) was 
replaced by the civil code (kodeks cywilny, k.c.).9 As far as the 
sources of obligations are concerned, the civil code of 1964 
followed more closely the structure of the BGB, although it 
generally continued the substance of the code of obligations. The 
Polish law of torts, found primarily in the code of obligations, did 
not go through many changes under of the socialist regime. After 
                                                                                                             
 6. See Katarzyna Sójka-Zielinska, La réception du Code Napoléon en 
Pologne in RAPPORTS POLONAIS PRÉSENTÉS AU HUITIÈME CONGRÈS 
INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ 210-16, 220 (Ossolineum 1970). 
 7. See Ewa Bagińska & Eugeniusz Kowalewski, The influence of Italian 
law on Polish private law in 2014 ANNUARIO DI DIRITTO COMPARATO ET DI 
STUDI LEGISLATIVI 437, 448. 
 8. Including, in particular, the French-Italian draft civil code of 1927; see 
Bagińska & Kowalewski, id. at 446-48, and the Polish literature cited therein. 
 9. Act of 23 April 1964, supra note 1. 
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the change of the political-economic regime in 1990, the main 
improvements include the introduction of strict product liability, 
reform of the liability of public authorities, and modifications of 
the rules governing recovery for non-pecuniary loss in non-
personal injury cases.10 Some solutions contained in the code of 
obligations were brought back to the Polish private law after 1990. 
II. GENERAL FEATURES OF POLISH TORT LAW 
Polish tort law represents the “general clause model,” not the 
German “protected interests model.” The general clause of article 
415 k.c. establishes tortious liability based upon proven fault. It is 
supplemented by a number of separate provisions located in the 
civil code and in other pieces of legislation that regulate tortious 
liability in specified situations. While some of them are also based 
on fault, others are examples of strict liability, absolute liability, or 
liability based on equity.11  
Fault was at first the dominant basis of liability but this has 
evolved in the direction of the other civil law systems—towards 
the approval of the principle of risk as an equally important and 
autonomous ground for liability.12 This notwithstanding, there 
must be a specific rule providing for strict liability cause of action, 
or otherwise the general clause for liability (i.e., fault liability) will 
govern the case. The principle of equity (fairness), on the other 
hand, is definitely supplemental. It is available only in the realm of 
tort liability, in three cases: public authority liability for legal 
conduct that caused personal injury (art. 417[2] k.c.), liability for 
animals (art. 431 § 2 k.c.), and personal liability of minors or 
incompetent persons (art. 428 k.c.). In all those situations, the 
courts tend to relax the burden with respect to proving adequate 
                                                                                                             
 10. Through several amendments to the civil code of 1964 (in 1990, 1996, 
and 2003). 
 11. See generally BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4. 
 12. See Adam Szpunar, Uwagi o funkcjach odpowiedzialności 
odszkodowawczej [Remarks about the Function of Liability], 58:1 PAŃSTWO I 
PRAWO 17-26 (2003). 
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causation, in addition to the fact that they impose the obligation to 
redress harm (which is usually personal injury) on the defendant 
who neither committed any fault nor is strictly liable. 
In contrast to French law, contractual and tortious liability are 
clearly separated. These two liability regimes are regarded as 
independent and distinct from one another in many respects, and 
yet they remain subject to some common rules and principles 
applicable to the law of obligations in general. These common 
rules are contained in Book III of the civil code (“Obligations”), 
but placed in two different titles: Title III (“General Rules on 
Contractual Obligations”), and Title VI (“Illicit Acts/Torts” (czyny 
niedozwolone)). Title I, which regulates general matters within the 
area of obligations, applies to both. It contains provisions 
concerning: 
- the determination of the extent of liability and compensation;  
- adequate causation (art. 361 §1 k.c.);  
- the principle of full compensation (art. 361 §2 k.c.);  
- contributory negligence (art. 362 k.c.); and  
- methods of repairing damage (art. 363 k.c.). 
In common with other European jurisdictions, the main factual 
elements of tortious and contractual liability for damages in Polish 
law are the same. First, there must be an event triggering damage, 
second, there must be damage, and third, causation should exist 
between the event and the damage. With regard to the procedural 
issues, one should note that there is no jury in the Polish system. 
The court evaluates the evidence and rules on the issues of facts 
and on questions of law.  
In Polish law there is no legal definition of damage. The 
concept of damage is closer to that of the French and Swiss 
traditions, rather than the German approach. In the legal literature 
and case law, damage is considered to be every wrong upon an 
interest protected by law, be it property or personality interests, 
2015] POLAND 315 
 
 
 
suffered by a person against her will.13 Both legal writers and 
courts generally refer to both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss 
when discussing the notion of “damage” in the civil code (as in, 
“liability for damage”). 
The notion of personal injury has not been given a detailed 
definition. Nevertheless, the civil code provides a short description 
in article 444 which includes “bodily injury or damage to health.” 
Thus, it is clear that any physical injuries are covered, as are any 
circumstances where a person’s internal organs are not functioning 
properly even though no apparent injury occurred. The latter types 
of damage to health include mental conditions and even mental 
trauma (which can be temporary).14 
It is commonly accepted that in Polish law there are three types 
of compensable damage: damage to person, damage to property, 
and damage to the environment.15 In this context it is not settled 
whether the notion of personal injury (damage to person) includes 
the violation of personal interests, which are of course embraced 
by the wide definition of damage. Modern doctrine seems to 
incline towards accepting this wider definition of personal injury. 
Nevertheless, in this article I will employ the traditional, strict 
definition of personal injury (i.e., embracing bodily harm and 
mental harm), hence leaving aside problems relating to 
compensation for the violation of personal interests (such as in 
defamation, slander, invasion of privacy, etc.)  
Causation, as the third requirement of liability, is based on the 
theory of adequate causation. Article 361 § 1 k.c. stipulates that 
                                                                                                             
 13. See ADAM SZPUNAR, USTALENIE ODSZKODOWANIA W PRAWIE 
CYWILNYM [DETERMINATION OF CIVIL LAW COMPENSATION] 36 (Prawnicze 
1975); ADAM SZPUNAR, ODSZKODOWANIE ZA SZKODĘ MAJĄTKOWĄ 
[COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE] 22-24 (Branta 1998). The last 
element of the definition is disputable in doctrine. The case law supports the 
dominant view, recently in the Supreme Court (Sad Najwyzsy, hereinafter SN) 
judgment of 25 January 2007, V CSK 423/06 (unpublished). 
 14. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 169, no. 329. 
 15. With respect to damage to the environment, account should be taken of 
arts. 322–28 of the Environmental Protection Law, Act of 27 April 2001, Dz.U. 
2001, no. 62, item 627, with amendments. 
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“the person obliged to pay compensation is liable only for the 
normal effects of the act or omission from which the damage 
resulted . . . .” This is known as the principle of “adequate 
causation.” It plays two roles in the Polish civil law: the role of 
establishing the premise of liability (causal link between the 
damage and the harmful event) and the role of limiting damages. 
The courts use objective criteria flowing from life experience and 
science for the establishment of adequate causation. 
With regard to the burden of proof, article 6 k.c. imposes the 
burden of proving causation on the injured person.16 There is no 
codified rule regarding the standard of proof. The courts have 
traditionally required “a probability bordering on certainty,” which 
means the judge must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt. Over 
the past decades the standard has shifted from “probability 
bordering on certainty” to “a sufficient degree of probability,” with 
the approval of legal scholarship.17 The shift has allowed the courts 
to award compensation in more complex scenarios involving 
personal injuries. Nowadays, courts typically state that the plaintiff 
has proved causation with a “sufficient (sufficiently high) degree 
of probability.”18 There are only subtle differences between the 
names given to the degree of probability.19 The question of what is 
a “sufficient degree” or a “significant degree” of probability 
depends on the individual case.20 
                                                                                                             
 16. “The burden of proof relating to a fact rests on the person who attributes 
legal consequences to that fact.” 
 17. See Ewa Bagińska, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in 
Poland in PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 253, 256 (I. Gilead, M.D. Green & B.A. Koch eds., De Gruyter 
2013). 
 18. SN judgment of 17 June 1969, II CR 165/69, Orzecznictwo Sądów 
Polskich (Decisions of the Polish Courts, OSP or formerly OSPiKA) OSPiKA 7-
8/1969, item 155. 
 19. See MACIEJ KALIŃSKI, SZKODA NA MIENIU I JEJ NAPRAWIENIE [DAMAGE 
TO PROPERTY AND ITS REDRESS] 400 (C.H. Beck 2008). 
 20. See SN judgment of 24 May 2005, V CK 654/04 (unpublished). 
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The principle of full compensation governs damages, although 
it is subject to many exceptions (both statutory and contractual).21 
Compensation ought to be equivalent to and not higher than the 
damage established. The scope of liability is determined by the 
following rules: articles 361–363 and, with respect to personal 
injury, articles 444–449 k.c. From a general principle of full 
compensation it follows that all kinds of damage must be 
redressed. Material (pecuniary) loss is to be repaired in every case. 
According to article 361 § 2 k.c.,22 the scope of pecuniary damage 
comprises damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. The so-called 
consequential loss is redressed as long as the test of adequate 
causation is met.23  
Further, Poland belongs to the group of legal systems where 
non-pecuniary loss is compensable only when it is permitted by the 
law.24 As a rule, non-pecuniary loss may not be compensated in the 
contractual regime unless the violation of a contract constitutes 
concurrently a tort (concurrence of liabilities), in which case the 
tort regime applies in toto to the claim for non-pecuniary loss 
damages.25 
Hence, the claim can be raised in personal injury cases sensu 
largo: 
a) bodily harm or health disorder, article 445 § 1 k.c;  
                                                                                                             
 21. See Ewa Bagińska, Droit polonais in LA RÉPARATION INTÉGRALE EN 
EUROPE: ÉTUDES COMPARATIVES DES DROITS NATIONAUX 360-378 (F. Leduc & 
P. Pierre eds., Larcier 2012). 
 22. Article 361 § 2 k.c. reads: “Within the limits specified above, in the 
absence of any legal or contractual provision to the contrary, damages shall 
include the losses suffered by the injured person and the profits which he could 
have gained had he not sustained the damage.” 
 23. See Ewa Bagińska & Mirosław Nesterowicz, Poland in 2 DIGEST OF 
EUROPEAN TORT LAW: ESSENTIAL CASES ON DAMAGE 53-54 (B. Winiger, H. 
Koziol, B.A. Koch & R. Zimmermann eds., De Gruyter 2011). 
 24. See W.V. Horton Rogers, Comparative Report of a Project Carried Out 
By the European Centre for Tort and Insurance Law in DAMAGES FOR NON-
PECUNIARY LOSS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 246 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 
Springer 2001). 
 25. See Ewa Bagińska & Mirosław Nesterowicz, Country Reports. Poland 
in DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY LOSS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 181-
82, no. 38 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., Springer 2001).  
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b) deprivation of liberty, article 445 § 2 k.c.;  
c) sexual assault or misconduct, article 445 § 2 k.c.; and 
d) infringement upon personal rights (interests), article 448 k.c.  
Pursuant to article 448 k.c., to which other rules of the civil 
code or outside the code refer, in the case of infringement of 
personal interests the court may award an injured person an 
adequate sum as compensation for non-pecuniary loss or, if she so 
demands, award an appropriate sum for a designated social 
purpose, irrespective of other means necessary to eliminate the 
effects of the damage caused.  
Special laws provide for other cases of compensation for non-
pecuniary loss, in particular in the sphere of medical liability (e.g., 
cases of infringement of patient rights, compensation for a blood 
donor), intellectual property law, and criminal law (unjust 
conviction, arrest or detention), as well as in the worker’s 
compensation system.26 
Moreover, compensation can be awarded to persons in close 
relationships with the victim in case of death (art. 446 § 3 k.c.), 
which is the equivalent of bereavement damages available in 
common law systems. 
Finally, punitive damages are not accepted by Polish law. 
Courts have held that damages are not intended to amount to a 
penalty, and damages awarded in civil proceedings may not, in any 
case, exceed the actual damage. 
In general, Polish tort law does not provide for liability caps. 
Any limitation with respect to personal injury claims does not arise 
from national legislation, but originates in binding international 
conventions,27 or EU directives, such as the 374/85 Product 
Liability Directive (which imposes a €500 threshold for property 
damage). 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Bagińska & Nesterowicz, id. at 174. 
 27. Most importantly, in the Warsaw-Montreal system governing the 
liability of air-carriers and the respective EU laws (e.g., Regulation no. 
889/2002) apply, with similar conventions governing transportation by other 
means. 
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With regard to procedural issues, one should recall that there is 
no jury in the Polish system. The court evaluates the evidence and 
decides both the issues of facts and the questions of law. 
III. CATEGORIES OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES  
In Polish law the categories of damages in cases of personal 
injury are regulated in much more detail than the in general 
categories of damage to property (real loss and lost profits, art. 361 
§ 2 k.c.). A list of claims that can be drawn from articles 444–446 
k.c., is presented below. It should be noted here that sums awarded 
as expenses and costs of treatment, annuity, as well as non-
pecuniary loss damages must be listed separately in the judgment. 
In particular, damages for pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss 
must always be awarded as separate elements, with independent 
justification in the motives. 
Where the damage already occurred and its extent is relatively 
clear, but it is impossible to determine its exact scope or assess its 
money value, the court can in these conditions use discretion and 
award a sum it considers adequate taking into account all the 
circumstances, using article 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
This margin of discretion cannot be used to adjudicate non-
pecuniary loss damages (detailed below). 
A. Claims of the Directly Injured  
1. Pecuniary Losses 
A general rule provides that in the case of bodily injury or a 
disturbance of health, the redress of damage covers all resulting 
costs (art. 444 § 1 k.c.). This includes all necessary and suitable 
expenses causally linked to the injury and paid out directly by the 
victim, as well as by other persons (for instance, the victim’s 
family, if the victim is a minor), if they are all included in the 
victim’s claim. Judicial decisions and scholarly writings construed 
the notion of ‘all costs’ broadly. Accordingly, it includes hospital 
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treatment, doctors, nurses and other medical practitioners’ visits, 
travel and accommodation related to treatment, expenses relating 
to rehabilitation, purchasing medicines, implants, other medical 
devices, and any other equipment necessary for treatment or the 
daily living needs of the victim (such as a pair of glasses, a hearing 
aid, a wheelchair, or a special needs vehicle required by the victim 
for attending treatment and carrying out business activities).28 It 
also extends to differences in income suffered by a person unable 
to work for a period of time.29  
The person obliged to redress the damage shall pay the sums 
required for the costs of medical treatment in advance. 
Second, the Polish system has established a distinguished 
model of reparation of damage in the form of annuity. Pursuant to 
article 444 § 2 k.c., if a victim completely or partially loses her 
ability to work or if her needs have increased or her future 
prospects have been diminished, she may demand an appropriate 
annuity from the person obliged to redress the damage. Any of the 
three grounds for an annuity, whether existing alone or 
concurrently with others, constitutes a sufficient ground for the 
claim. However, according to case law, an annuity based on the 
loss of earning capacity or on the loss of future prospects (e.g., 
inability to carry out a profession or obtain specialization), may not 
be awarded to a minor who can claim an annuity on the ground 
that his/her needs have increased (this includes, for instance, 
permanent expenses for treatment or care and assistance by third 
persons). On the other hand, an annuity for the loss of ability to 
work should reflect the shortfall in income, taking into account 
what the injured person would be expecting to earn if the injury did 
not occur; it can also be awarded to a person who is not employed 
but runs a household (usually a stay-at-home mother). 
                                                                                                             
 28. SN judgment of 14 May 1997, II UKN 113/97, OSP 1998, no. 6, item 
121. 
 29. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 169, no. 331. 
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When awarding an annuity to the victim of a personal injury a 
court usually makes an overall assessment of different elements of 
pecuniary damage, including loss of earnings and loss of earning 
capacity. Polish courts have emphasized that in the case of a 
diminution of working capacity, the damage cannot be purely 
theoretical. Some pecuniary consequences of the loss must be 
proven. Accordingly, this damage should be understood as the 
difference between what the victim could have received from her 
work if the damaging event had not occurred and what she will 
actually receive after this occurrence. The income of a victim after 
a damaging event is not to be compared to the pre-accident 
earnings or the lack of them, but to those she would have earned if 
there had been no accident. It is sufficient that the victim proves a 
high probability of receiving this income.30 
An annuity must be “appropriate”; the court enjoys a margin of 
discretion in the assessment of its extent. If, at the moment of 
adjudication, the damage cannot be accurately assessed, the 
plaintiff may be awarded a temporary annuity. 
By way of exception, pursuant to article 447 k.c., a court may 
for important reasons and upon the victim’s request award a lump 
sum instead of an annuity or a part thereof. In particular, this 
applies to a case where the injured person became disabled and the 
award of a lump sum would help her to engage in another 
profession. The victim carries the burden of establishing the 
existence of “important reasons.” The assessment of a lump sum is 
based on the annuity to which the plaintiff would be entitled. The 
payment of a lump sum must equate with the obligation to pay an 
annuity (hence, as long as the victim is entitled to an annuity he 
may request a lump sum). 
 
                                                                                                             
 30. SN judgment of 30 January 2004, I CK 131/03, OSNC 2/2005, at 40; 
Ewa Bagińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2005, at 460-63, nos. 16-26 (H. 
Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer 2006) [hereinafter Poland (2005)]. 
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2. Victim’s Claim for Non-Pecuniary Loss (Pain and Suffering) 
The direct victim has a pecuniary claim for non-pecuniary loss 
stemming from bodily injury, i.e., for pain and suffering and moral 
damage (art. 445 §1 k.c.). The same legal basis applies when no 
injury occurred to the person concerned and the only type of 
detriment is moral suffering and trauma. 
Anyone may demand redress for non-pecuniary loss. This 
extends to a foetus’ claim for prenatal damages (art. 446[1] k.c.). 
The latter claim can be made against a third person or against the 
mother.31 
In Polish law an award of compensation for non-pecuniary loss 
is discretionary (left to the court) and an assessment is made in 
light of the circumstances of the case. This does not mean that the 
court is free to award or not award damages. It can deny an award 
only when some objective criteria are met; in particular, when: i) 
the damage was inappreciable and the tortfeasor cannot be held 
negligent, ii) the injured person largely contributed to the damage, 
or iii) bodily injury ensued from the injured person’s blameworthy, 
criminal conduct. The denial of damages for non-pecuniary loss 
would not release a tortfeasor from liability for compensation of 
pecuniary loss. 
The courts use objective standards to determine the amount of 
compensation. Courts should consider all circumstances of a 
particular case in assessing compensation,32 in particular: the 
degree of physical and mental suffering and how long it lasted, 
how permanent the injuries are, what the future prospects are 
concerning life expectancy and quality of life (for instance 
regarding social life, travel or work), and the age of the victim. 
Courts have also emphasized that a high degree of the tortfeasor’s 
fault should result in an increased sum of damages. Moral 
suffering may well be amplified by the tortfeasor’s insensible 
                                                                                                             
 31. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 174, nos. 343-44. 
 32. See Bagińska & Nesterowicz, supra note 25, at 176 et seq. 
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behaviour after the tortious event in failing to undertake an action 
mitigating the damage.33 
The extent of the damages cannot be attributed to the current 
material status of the victim.34 
Damages for non-pecuniary loss first play a compensatory role 
as they purport to make good for the moral harm. Relating the 
amount of the award to an average salary may be helpful, but this 
cannot be done mechanically. The aim of the damages is to 
compensate non-pecuniary harm, which is very difficult to 
measure. Courts have recently rejected the criterion developed in 
the nineteen-sixties and -seventies, according to which the size of 
the award should reflect “the current living conditions of an 
average member of society.” The present jurisprudence and 
doctrine underline that this factor is only supplementary and may 
not lead to the frustration of the compensatory function of damages 
for moral harm.35 
B. Claims upon the Victim’s Death 
Damage remedies for the close persons (family members) in 
the case of the victim’s death (the so called victims par ricochet) 
are governed by article 446 k.c. and include five kinds of claims. 
First, the costs of treatment and the funeral are to be refunded 
to the person who has incurred them (art. 446 § 1 k.c.). This claim 
does not belong to the estate of the deceased, but is an autonomous 
claim by the person who actually incurred the expenses, unless the 
costs were paid by the decendent herself. 
Second, those in respect of whom the deceased had a statutory 
duty of maintenance have the right to an annuity from the person 
liable. This type of annuity is referred to as a “mandatory annuity,” 
                                                                                                             
 33. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 160, 174, nos. 309, 344. 
 34. SN judgment of 17 September 2010, II CSK 94/10, OSNC 4/2011, item 
44. 
 35. SN judgment of 30 January 2004, I CK 131/03, OSN 2/2005, at 40; SN 
judgment of 10 March 2006, IV CSK 80/05, OSP 1/2007, at 11. 
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because if all the conditions for tortious liability specified in the 
provision applicable in the case are met, the court must make an 
award. Duties of maintenance are regulated by the Family and 
Care Code of 1964,36 and include descendants, and, in some cases, 
siblings, other relatives, and divorced or separated spouses.37 With 
regard to actual spouses the position was clarified by the Supreme 
Court’s decision of 20 December 1990.38 The obligation to satisfy 
the financial needs of the family rests upon every married person 
(Art. 27 of the Family and Care Code). This, of course, extends to 
situations where one of the spouses does not work and runs the 
household, rearing the children. However, prior to the Supreme 
Court decision mentioned above, it was generally accepted that 
tortfeasors who caused death were not liable to pay an annuity to 
the surviving spouse where the latter was working, or at least was 
capable of working, and there were no dependent children. 
Maintaining the latter’s lifestyle was not seen as an adequate basis 
for an obligation to compensate. In the 1990 decision the Court 
held that spouses can be awarded annuity until they are in a 
financial position to sustain themselves and their family. 
Third, an annuity may also be claimed by persons who were in 
a close relationship with the deceased and whom he voluntarily 
maintained on a regular, long-term basis (art. 446 §2 k.c.). This 
type of annuity is referred to as a “voluntary/facultative annuity.” 
The court can award a voluntary annuity as long as the principles 
of community life so require (considering the financial position of 
both parties, the relationship between the deceased and the 
beneficiary, and the context in which the voluntary support was 
taking place, especially its purposes). This provision is particularly 
relevant in case of cohabitees.39 
                                                                                                             
 36. Act of 25 February 1964, Dz.U. 1964, no. 9, item 59, with amendments. 
 37. Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy [Family and Care Code], 25 February 
1964, arts. 128-34 & 60. 
 38. SN judgment of 20 December 1990, II PR 61/90, Praca i Zab. Spol. 
1991, nos. 5-6, p. 64. 
 39. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 172-73, nos. 338-41. 
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For all those who are entitled to payments, the annuity is 
assessed by taking into account the needs of the claimant and the 
earnings and financial means of the deceased. The nature of claims 
for an annuity is compensatory; they are not a type of maintenance 
claim. The persons are entitled to enforce those claims sui generis, 
thus the cause of action is independent of the rights of the directly 
injured and of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss compensation 
that she has received before her death. If the directly injured 
person, while still alive, relinquishes or settles the claims, these 
acts will have no legal effect after her death. 
Fourth, the code also allows immediate family members of the 
deceased to claim compensation for a considerable deterioration of 
their living standards (art. 446 §3 k.c.). The compensation extends 
to the damage which is not grounds for an annuity. These are types 
of pecuniary damage in a broad sense, often difficult to assess 
exactly, as well as non-pecuniary damage, both leading to 
substantial deterioration of an immediate family member’s 
financial position. For example, the loss of maternal care and 
support constitutes a worsening in the child’s situation, and merits 
the indemnity on the basis of article 446 §3 k.c.40 Such losses 
include not only changes in the actual economic position, but also 
losses of the realistically foreseeable prospects for improvement of 
the living conditions: for instance death of a son whose financial 
help in the near future could be counted on by his parents,41 or 
death of a person thanks to whom the claimant planned to improve 
his living conditions.42 Although, in general, mere grief is not to be 
compensated, a severe mental trauma (for instance, in case of the 
spouse’s or the long-time partner’s death), or feeling of solitude 
(for instance, the loss of a mother by a minor) may increase the 
degree of the decline in one’s quality of life and therefore should 
merit an award. 
                                                                                                             
 40. SN judgment of 6 February 1968, OSNC 1969, item 14. 
 41. SN judgment of 13 May 1969, OSPiKA 1969, item 122. 
 42. SN judgment of 8 July 1974, OSPiKA 1975, item 204. 
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Finally, the ability to obtain compensation of non-pecuniary 
damage caused by the death of a close relative (bereavement 
damages) is a new addition to the civil code. It was introduced by 
the Act of 30 May 2008 (amending the civil code), and in force 
since August 3, 2008,43 although throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s, courts utilized the ability to award compensation of 
pecuniary damage mentioned above to include some purely non-
pecuniary losses as well. Close relatives are entitled to 
bereavement damages if the victim of a tort died on or after August 
3, 2008. 
If the directly injured has survived, there is no explicit claim 
for non-pecuniary loss of the close persons under Polish law. They 
may demand damages only upon proof of their own personal injury 
(a physical injury or a health disorder, such as depression or other 
similar medically recognized conditions). It is sufficient to prove 
that the causative factor simply exacerbated an existing health 
disorder or increased physical suffering. With regard to psychiatric 
injury, Polish law does not set any special threshold for a 
qualifying claim. 
IV. THE MAIN TRENDS IN COURT PRACTICE (2000–2014)  
A. The Cost of Future Treatment and the Assessment of Annuities 
The actual amounts awarded to injured victims with regard to 
pecuniary losses reflect the true cost of medical care, treatment and 
rehabilitation in Poland. A large part of such costs is borne by the 
state-funded health care system (with the exception of 
pharmaceuticals, which are as a rule co-paid by the insured).44 The 
public health care system is open to all citizens and is mandatory; 
it is the so-called universal health insurance system based on 
                                                                                                             
 43. Act of 30 May 2008, Dz.U. 2008, no. 116, item 731. 
 44. For a detailed analysis of the health care system in Poland, see 
MIROSŁAW NESTEROWICZ, EWA BAGIŃSKA & ANDRÉ DEN EXTER, 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: MEDICAL LAW, 20-26, nos. 27-46 
(Herman Nys ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 2013). 
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premiums paid by all employees and entrepreneurs. Other persons 
(for example, foreign students) can get access to the system as well 
by paying the premium. The specific feature of Polish health care, 
however, is the relative importance and popularity of private 
medical care that exists alongside the state-funded system. Patients 
often use private healthcare, particularly in urgent situations. As 
long as the private alternative can realistically, based on sound 
medical prognosis, improve the patient’s chances of recovery from 
a serious medical condition, the patient is not obliged to use the 
public system.45 Moreover, the more serious the condition, the 
more likely it is that a medical service unavailable in Poland will 
be sought abroad, whether in another EU Member State or outside 
the EU. Consequently, the tortfeasor may be obliged to reimburse 
much higher costs.  
This approach was confirmed in a judgment of the Supreme 
Court of 13 December 2007 (I CSK 384/07).46 In this case the 
plaintiff suffered from brachial birth palsy. His disability was at 
that time 60%, but he had a positive medical prognosis. He was 
operated on twice in the US, which was paid for by the State, and 
consulted with specialists in Leeds and Paris at his parents’ cost. In 
the lawsuit he demanded inter alia $55,000 to cover the cost of a 
third operation in Houston, TX. The hospital and its insurer 
questioned the obligation to pay the treatment cost in advance, 
referring the plaintiff to the Ministry for Health and Public 
Resources. After six years of trial the Regional Court awarded 
PLN 237,000 ($78,000) for pecuniary damage and PLN 200,000 
($66,000) for non-pecuniary loss (as demanded). On appeal, 
however, the damages for pain and suffering were reduced to PLN 
120,000 ($40,000) and the claim for future medical expenses was 
dismissed because the plaintiff did not prove that they would not 
                                                                                                             
 45. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 171, no. 335. 
 46. OSP 2/2009, item 2046; Ewa Bagińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT 
LAW 2009 at 497-98, no. 66 (H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., De Gruyter 
2010) [hereinafter Poland (2009)]. 
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be refunded ex post by the State. The Supreme Court reversed the 
verdict and remanded the case. It regarded the damages for non-
pecuniary loss as too low to fulfill the purpose of adequate 
compensation. As to the medical expenses, the Court held that 
under article 444 § 1 k.c. the plaintiff must only prove that he has a 
valid claim for all necessary costs arising from a tort. The burden 
of proof that the costs of the operation in the U.S. were to be 
covered ex post from public resources was on the defendant. The 
Court emphasized that a victim of a tort had no obligation to use 
the public health care system in order to restore his/her health 
condition to its previous state. After all, the public health care 
system may be used only by the insured (through the compulsory 
universal health insurance), and the conclusion reached by the 
Court of Appeals would put the insured victim of a tort at a 
disadvantage in comparison with the uninsured victim. This 
decision is correct and confirms the long-established case law. In 
the former regime, a claim for advance payment of treatment costs 
was rarely raised because of the generous public health care 
system. Presently, with scarce public resources, many specialized 
procedures are available only by request and granted by the 
National Health Fund or the Ministry for Health on a case-by-case 
basis.  
It should be explained further that future loss (when at the time 
of adjudication not all the harmful effects of the tort have 
materialized) and future costs that are highly likely to occur can be 
sought as part of an annuity. If, at some point in the future, 
circumstances change (for instance, the victim’s health deteriorates 
significantly), either of the parties may request modification of the 
annuity (art. 907 § 2 k.c.).47 The plaintiff may also ask for a 
determination of liability for future losses.48  
                                                                                                             
 47. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 171, no. 334. 
 48. SN judgment of 24 March 2009, III CZP 02/09, OSNC 12/2009, item 
138; Bagińska, Poland (2009), supra note 46, at 486-88, nos. 34-41. 
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In the judgment of 17 June 2009 (IV CSK 37/09),49 the 
Supreme Court ruled that negligent omissions of the health care 
providers can lead to damages that take the form of lost or reduced 
chances for healing or improvement of the health condition. The 
standard of proof in such cases should be a sufficient degree of 
probability. In this, case a minor lost his chance to reduce the 
disability, for which no-one was to blame. He was diagnosed with 
cerebral palsy and epilepsy in December 1999. The early signs of 
the disease, reported by the mother shortly after his birth in 1998, 
were either ignored or misdiagnosed by the attending doctors. If 
cerebral palsy had been diagnosed at an early stage, the 
effectiveness of rehabilitation could have been 20% better. 
Adequate causation between the negligent delay in discovering of 
the cause of the disability and the lost chance of improvement 
through rehabilitation was established; nevertheless, the lower 
courts did not find grounds for awarding an annuity. The Supreme 
Court held that the minor plaintiff was entitled to both 
compensation for non-pecuniary loss and an annuity based on the 
increase of needs as a result of a tort. Cerebral palsy is a life-long 
disease, and any improvement in the child’s condition that can be 
made is reached principally through proper and constant 
rehabilitation. The late diagnosis may lead to increased expenses, 
as delayed rehabilitation is less effective and more difficult. This 
case can be seen as a loss of chance case. Polish courts approach 
cases of this kind from the perspective of damage rather than 
causation. If the damage is personal injury, the standard of proof is 
lowered to a sufficient degree of probability. The Polish courts 
have awarded damages for a lost chance of healing or a lost chance 
of improvement of the patient’s condition either under the category 
of a pecuniary damage (in the form of an annuity) or as 
                                                                                                             
 49. OSP 9/2010, item 93; Ewa Bagińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 
2010 at 464-66, nos. 45-51 (H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., De Gruyter 2011) 
[hereinafter Poland (2010)]. 
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compensation for non-pecuniary loss.50 From the perspective of a 
minor with a life-long, incurable disease, whose harm takes a form 
of losing or reducing the chances for health improvement, an 
annuity guarantees better protection for the future. The amount of 
an annuity is subject to revision by a court in case of a change in 
circumstances.51 
Another interesting case that marks a victim-friendly approach 
is represented by the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Poznan 
judgment of 15 December 2009 (I ACa 848/09).52 In this decision 
the court applied article 447 k.c. and awarded lump-sum 
compensation instead of an annuity to an older woman who was hit 
by a truck while negligently crossing the street. The injuries 
suffered as a result of the accident eventually led to a 50% 
permanent disability. The lower court established that the plaintiff 
contributed to her damage by 90%, but the Court of Appeal 
assessed the contribution to be 75%. The demand for non-
pecuniary loss was justified under the circumstances, but the award 
was ultimately reduced to PLN 30,800 ($10,200) due to the 
contributory negligence. Moreover, instead of an annuity, the 
plaintiff demanded PLN 125,000 ($41,600) as a lump sum. That 
claim was dismissed as unsubstantiated by a lower court, but the 
Court of Appeals, after having found that the plaintiff met her 
burden of proof, considered the prerequisites of article 447 k.c. 
Pursuant to that provision, for important reasons the court may, at 
the request of the injured person, award him lump-sum 
compensation instead of an annuity or a part thereof. However, 
none of the typically accepted “important reasons” were present in 
                                                                                                             
 50. See, e.g., SN judgment of 1 September 1978, CR 510/77, OSNC 
11/1978, item 210. 
 51. Based on art. 907 k.c., the person responsible, or the victim, may ask the 
court to adjust the amount or duration of the annuity or to discontinue it 
completely in the case of changed circumstances. 
 52. See Ewa Bagińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2011 at 514-15, no. 
79 (K. Oliphant & B.C. Steininger eds., De Gruyter 2012) [hereinafter Poland 
(2011)]. 
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this case.53 Nevertheless, the Court regarded the difficult financial 
situation of the plaintiff as an important reason. According to the 
facts, the seventy-two-year-old victim was retired, but a part of her 
very low pension was taken away by the court executor to pay for 
her debts, and the rest was fully consumed by monthly 
expenditures. The annuity, if awarded, would amount to PLN 75 
per month (as reduced by 75% due to contributory fault), which 
obviously would not cover her increased needs. Conversely, a 
lump sum would allow her to pay her debts and raise the actual net 
income from her pension, which in turn would allow her to cover 
the current and future increased expenses due to the tort. The 
payment of a lump sum must be equivalent to the obligation to pay 
an annuity and cover both present and future damage. However, 
the law does not state what period of time should be taken into 
account in the calculation of the award. The Court thus referred to 
the average life expectancy in Poland, which is 80 years for 
women, and calculated that the annuity for eight years equaled 
PLN 7,200 ($2,400). The reasoning of the Court is compelling and 
should be approved of as it fulfills the aims of damages and takes 
into account the individual situation of the victim.  
A final issue, although of lesser importance, concerns the 
consideration of illicit profits. In the case of 20 January 2004,54 the 
defendant questioned the inclusion of the “grey zone” income of 
the deceased into the computation of an annuity. The income was 
not revealed in a personal income declaration, nor was it taxed. 
The Supreme Court held that, although the phenomenon of the 
“grey zone” in the labour market should meet with disapproval, the 
computation of an annuity in wrongful death cases is not 
dependent on the taxed income, but on the earning capacity of the 
deceased and on his financial standing, including, but not limited 
                                                                                                             
 53. Article 447 k.c. shall especially apply in a case where the injured person 
has become disabled, and the award of a lump-sum payment would facilitate his 
exercise of a new occupation. 
 54. II CK 360/02, Lex no. 173557. 
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to, his actual income. However, on similar facts, the Court of 
Appeals in Bialystok in a judgment of 18 September 200255 ruled 
to the contrary. It held that regular illicit earnings received by the 
deceased victim within “the grey zone” might not lead to an 
increase in the sum of damages. The court stated that failure to pay 
personal income tax is a fiscal criminal offence. Such an income 
also contradicts the principles of community life (principles of 
equity and justice). 
B. The Scope and Function of Compensation of Non-Pecuniary 
Loss Awarded to Direct Victims 
1. Medical Malpractice Cases 
One should clarify here that in medical cases there are two 
independent bases for awarding non-pecuniary loss damages: (i) 
medical malpractice which inflicts pain and suffering (art. 445 
k.c.), and (ii) the infringement of a patient’s right (art. 4 of the 
Patients’ Rights Act, in conjunction with art. 448 k.c.).56 There has 
been some litigation recently regarding the relationship between 
these two bases of a claim. It has been held that article 445 k.c. 
aims at compensation for pain and suffering due to personal injury 
and that article 4 of the Patients’ Rights Act protects dignity, 
privacy and the autonomy of a patient, regardless of the diligence 
and effectiveness of medical intervention.57 Hence, the two claims 
can be cumulated.58 Below we focus on the pure malpractice cases. 
In present practice, the level of compensation in personal injury 
cases is increasingly high. The following cases are illustrative 
examples of this trend. 
                                                                                                             
 55. I ACa 399/02, OSAB 2003, at 7. 
 56. Law on Patients’ Rights and the Patients’ Ombudsman, Act of 6 
November 2008, Dz.U. 2009, no. 52, item 417 and no. 76, item 641. 
 57. SN judgment of 29 May 2007, V CSK 76/07, OSN 7-8/2008, item 91; 
Ewa Bagińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008 at 511-13, nos. 53-60 (H. 
Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer 2009) [hereinafter Poland (2008)]. 
 58. See Ewa Bagińska, Remedying patients for moral harm arising from an 
infringement of patients’ rights, 15 COMP. L. REV. (NICOLAUS COPERNICUS 
UNIV.) 45 (2013). 
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In 2001, in a case where the plaintiff’s leg was amputated 
because the doctors failed to diagnose artery damage incurred in a 
motorcycle accident, the Regional Court in Krakow awarded PLN 
50,000 ($16,600) for non-pecuniary loss.59 In 2006, the wrongful 
removal of a kidney resulted in the award of PLN 150,000 
($50,000) by the Supreme Court.60 The same amount was 
adjudicated in 2007 to a 50-year-old victim of negligence in a 
standard procedure for the removal of kidney stones which resulted 
in the victim’s 45% permanent disability and a total loss of 
working capacity.61 In the decision of 13 June 2007 (VI ACa 
1246/06)62 the Court of Appeals in Warsaw established the 
hospital’s liability for the lack of informed consent to cardiac 
surgery, during which the patient suffered a stroke. The patient 
became disabled due to the neurological damage. No medical error 
was established. The plaintiff claimed PLN 250,000 ($83,000), the 
Regional Court awarded PLN 50,000 ($16,600) as damages for 
moral harm, but the sum was doubled on appeal (final award: 
$33,000). 
A striking example of the change in the trend concerns hospital 
infections. In the late 1990s, compensation for infection with 
Hepatitis B amounted to PLN 5,000 ($1,600) for adult patients and 
as much as PLN 8,000 ($2,600) for minors; PLN 20,000 to 50,000 
($6,600 to $16,600) was awarded for Hepatitis C infections.63 In 
the last decade these amounts were doubled or even tripled; in 
                                                                                                             
 59. Published in RZECZPOSPOLITA, 3 April 2001. The amount was 
converted into dollars based on the average rate $1 = 3 PLN. 
 60. SN judgment of 10 March 2006, IV CSK 80/05, OSP 1/2007, item 11; 
Ewa Bagińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2007 at 453-55, nos. 13-17 (H. 
Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer 2008) [hereinafter Poland (2007)]. 
 61. Court of Appeals (Sad Apelacyjny, hereinafter SA) in Krakow judgment 
of 12 October 2007, I ACa 920/07, (2010) Prawo i Medycyna (PiM) 1, 151, cmt 
by M. Nesterowicz. 
 62. SA in Warsaw judgment of 13 June 2007,VI ACa 1246/06, OSA 
12/2009, item 64. 
 63. See Kinga Bączyk-Rozwadowska, Medical Malpractice and 
Compensation in Poland, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1217, 1251 (2011). 
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2010 the average compensation for a non- pecuniary loss resulting 
from hepatitis C amounted to PLN 375,000 ($125,000).64 
In contrast, cases of birth-related injuries can presently trigger 
successful non-pecuniary claims as high as PLN 500,000-
1,000,000 ($166,000-$333,000), which may be compared with ten 
years previously, when amounts between PLN 50,000 and 90,000 
($16,600 to $30,000) were considered adequate.65 It is well-
established case law that the younger the age of the victim, the 
greater the moral harm. Apart from birth-related injuries, we can 
refer to a case where a young girl who, after several months of 
inadequate treatment, suffered necrosis of parts of her skin and 
permanent scarring (50% disability), was awarded (at the age of 
eleven) $83,300 for non-pecuniary loss.66  
Finally, in a rare case a comatose victim of malpractice at birth 
who had no contact with the outside world and did not feel pain 
was awarded $166,000 in 2008.67 Thus, it is relatively unimportant 
whether the victim is, because of her mental state, unable to realize 
the full impact of what happened, or whether the victim has 
particularly acute sensitivity and thus suffered a much more 
intense mental trauma.  
In a groundbreaking decision of March 24, 2011,68 the 
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of succession of a child’s claim 
for non-pecuniary loss by its parents. On the facts, a medical 
malpractice at childbirth (in particular, the failure to perform a 
Caesarean section) led to enormous injuries to the child who, while 
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. at 1251. 
 65. See Ewa Bagińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2001 at 391-92, 
nos. 42–45 (H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer 2002) [hereinafter 
Poland (2001)]. 
 66. SA in Poznan judgment of 23 November 2006, I ACa 561/06, PiM 
2/2008, 140, cmt by M. Nesterowicz. 
 67. See SA in Rzeszow judgment of 12 October 2006, I ACa 377/06; 
Bagińska, Poland (2009), supra note 46, at 493-94, nos. 57-59.  
 68. I CSK 389/10, OSNC-ZD 1/2012, item 22; Ewa Bagińska & Katarzyna 
Krupa-Lipińska, Poland in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2012 at 537-39, nos. 51-57 
(K. Oliphant & B.C. Steininger eds., De Gruyter 2013) [hereinafter Poland 
(2012)]. 
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never conscious, was kept alive by doctors for 14 months before 
dying. Before the child’s death, the parents sued the hospital for 
compensation on the child’s behalf, and then continued the trial as 
successors of the child’s right of action (art. 445 § 3 k.c.69). The 
patent fault of the doctors was established and the court of first 
instance awarded a record sum of PLN 1 million ($333,000) as 
damages for non-pecuniary loss (arts. 446[1] and 445 k.c.), having 
ruled that the child’s harm was unspeakably grave. On appeal the 
award was reduced by 80% due to the fact that the money was to 
be paid to the parents seeking compensation de iure hereditatis; 
hence it should not enrich them. Moreover, the court held that the 
child had died so early in its life that it could not be argued that it 
had suffered moral harm, as its psyche had not been shaped; 
accordingly the child was only able to experience physical pain 
and suffering. That decision was attacked in cassation to the 
Supreme Court, who did not agree with the reduction of the award 
by the court of appeal. The Court recalled that, pursuant to article 
446[1] k.c., after its birth a child can claim compensation for any 
prenatal damage it suffered, including damage stemming from 
medical malpractice directed at the child’s mother before its birth. 
The compensation calculated by the lower court rightly took into 
consideration all the horrendous conditions of the child’s painful 
life and in this respect the court met the criteria of compensating 
non-pecuniary loss. Although objectively very high, the award 
correctly took into account the primary compensatory function of 
the claim. The principle that compensation must be adequate (i.e., 
proportionate) to the harm suffered does not give permission to 
recklessly disregard human life, as had happened in this case. The 
Court also held that whether or not a newborn is able to suffer 
moral damage or physical pain and suffering is irrelevant and 
cannot be a reason to reduce the compensation. The fact that the 
                                                                                                             
 69. “A claim for compensation for non-pecuniary harm shall pass to the 
heirs of the deceased only if this was agreed in writing or the action was 
commenced when the deceased was still alive.” 
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child died during the trial and the parents stepped into the 
proceedings as successors to the child’s right of action is not 
grounds to lower the compensation for the child’s harm. The 
Supreme Court deviated from early cases70 which endorsed the 
view that a court, when calculating damages for moral harm, 
should take into account the fact that the damages awarded were to 
be paid to the successors of a victim who died during the trial. In 
the commented decision the Court ruled that the claim passes to 
the heirs by way of exception provided for in article 445 § 3 k.c., 
since in principle all claims for personal injuries become extinct 
upon the death of the injured person. The claim for compensation 
of moral harm does not change due to the fact that the victim dies 
before the award has been issued. The extent of reparation may not 
be determined by such an unforeseeable and uncertain event as 
death before or after the award. The parents also have their own 
(sui generis) claims for bereavement damages as indirect victims 
(art. 446 § 4 k.c.) and this compensation claim is different to that 
which the victim is entitled to pursue. The case calls for the 
legislative intervention and introduction of a clear-cut rule 
concerning the award of damages for non-pecuniary loss in 
wrongful death cases. Presently, it is uncertain whether the parents 
can collect twice: once as heirs and once as indirect victims.71 One 
should also emphasize the hopefully preventive effect toward 
avoidable medical errors by the highest ever award in such a case 
in Poland. Despite their compensatory function, the damages aim 
at the deterrence of reprehensible conduct, and in this case the 
doctor’s malpractice amounted to gross negligence.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 70. See, e.g., SN judgment of 12 April 1972, II CR 57/72, OSNCP 10/1972, 
item 183. 
 71. See Mirosław Nesterowicz, Comment, 7-8 Przegląd Sądowy 200 et seq. 
(2012). 
2015] POLAND 337 
 
 
 
2. Traffic Liability Cases 
Traffic accidents make up the majority of personal injury cases 
in Poland.72 According to statistics, Poland unfortunately led the 
EU countries in 2011 with the death rate of 109 killed in car 
accidents per one million inhabitants, while in 2012 it was 93 per 
one million inhabitants. Over 40,000 victims per year suffer 
personal injuries, 21% of these being pedestrians). There are 
approximately 25.5 million registered vehicles in Poland; the 
motorization index is 470 cars per 1000 inhabitants.  
With regard to more serious injuries, we should mention the 
case where a 51-year-old man who suffered serious injuries in a car 
accident and was declared 77% disabled, with a complete, 
irreversible loss of working capacity and the loss of sexual 
functions, was awarded $66,000 by the Court of Appeals; the 
verdict was, however, reversed by the Supreme Court in 2008. In 
another case, the victim of a traffic accident, who became 
quadriplegic and regained consciousness only after several months 
of hospitalization, filed a claim for PLN 400,000 ($133,000) for 
non-pecuniary damage. After his death his successors (a wife and 
two children) continued the lawsuit and the Court of Appeals in 
Lublin awarded them the demanded sum in equal shares; the 
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2008.73  
Additional problems have been caused by the introduction of 
bereavement damages in 2008, as will be seen below. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 72. See the analysis in Polska Izba Ubezpieczeń [Polish Chamber of 
Insurance], Rynek ubezpieczeń komunikacyjnych w Polsce [Automobile 
Insurance Market in Poland] (2011-2013), available at http://piu.org.pl/public 
/upload/ibrowser/analizy%20i%20raporty/raport_komunikacyjny_2011_2013. 
pdf. 
 73. SN judgment of 27 November 2008, IV CSK 306/08, OSP 11/2009, 
item 121; Bagińska, Poland (2009), supra note 46, at 497, no. 65. 
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3. Individual versus Uniform Approach to Compensatory 
Claims 
As it was mentioned earlier, when assessing a claim for pain 
and suffering, Polish courts apply general and abstract criteria to 
the individual situation of a given plaintiff in the assessment of a 
claim for pain and suffering (such as the victim’s age and personal 
situation, the degree and duration of physical and mental suffering, 
the long-term effects of the tortious conduct and similar 
circumstances). The main principle is that each case of bodily 
injury and mental harm requires an individual approach, with 
regard to the facts of the case. Due to the specific criteria for the 
evaluation of non-pecuniary loss, an award of damages may 
successfully be attacked in cassation to the Supreme Court only 
when it flagrantly violates these criteria. Such a situation took 
place in a case decided by the Supreme Court on April 20, 2006 
(IV CSK 99/05).74 The plaintiff (a 53-year-old woman) was 
diagnosed with hepatitis C infection and subsequent liver cirrhosis. 
She was declared 70% disabled, suffered from great pain and 
nervous shock; the probability of developing liver cancer was 5%. 
The Court of Appeals awarded PLN 100,000 ($33,000) as damages 
for pain and suffering (the plaintiff claimed the equivalent of 
$60,000). The Supreme Court allowed cassation and held that, 
although the lower courts had used proper general criteria of 
assessment, they had failed to apply them correctly to the facts of 
the case. The Court raised the compensation to PLN 150,000 
($50,000) in order to more adequately redress the plaintiff for the 
suffering, the anxiety, the actual moral harm and for the negative 
future prognosis. The Court determined that only the higher sum 
would perform the compensatory function properly. 
More importantly, the Supreme Court ruled that the amount of 
awards adjudicated in other cases should not be taken into account 
as a factor to reduce compensation in a given case. An interesting 
                                                                                                             
 74. OSP 4/2009, item 40. 
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issue arises in a not-so-rare situation (considering the movement of 
persons within the European Union) where the victim is a foreign 
citizen. According to the Supreme Court the standard of living in 
the country where the victim lives should be taken into 
consideration in the evaluation of damages. The case decided on 
February 14, 2008 (II CSK 536/07),75 involved a German citizen 
who was injured in a car accident in Poland. He claimed PLN 
185,000 ($60,000) for serious injuries (multiple fractures, several 
operations, altogether four years of medical treatment and 75% 
disability), arguing that an award of non-pecuniary damages 
should reflect the living standard in Germany (the country of his 
habitual residence). The Regional Court awarded PLN 82,000 and 
the Court of Appeals raised this to PLN 120,000 ($40,000), 
because compensation of non-pecuniary loss should have a real 
economic value in order to fulfill its compensatory function. 
However, the Court determined that the standard of living in 
Germany, which “is not dramatically different than in Poland,” is 
not a proper criterion of assessment of these damages. On review, 
the Supreme Court emphasized that damages for non-pecuniary 
loss should first of all relate to the injury and take into account all 
the relevant circumstances, in particular the gravity of pain, 
duration of the disease and permanent effects of the damaging act. 
Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to PLN 150,000 ($50,000). 
Second, taking into account the current living conditions in the 
victim’s home country for determining the size of the award is 
generally acceptable, but the application of this criterion may not 
lead to the frustration of the compensatory function of damages for 
moral harm. It may only be treated as a supplementary criterion to 
reduce the non-pecuniary damages. The Supreme Court concluded 
that even after considering the standard of living in Germany, the 
sum of PLN 150,000 was still adequate within the meaning of 
article 445 k.c. 
                                                                                                             
 75. OSP 5/2010, item 47; Bagińska, Poland (2010), supra note 49, at 475-
76, no. 76. 
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In another case of November 26, 2009, (III CSK 62/09),76 the 
Supreme Court held that the amount of awards adjudicated in other 
cases can help to evaluate whether the award in a given case was 
not unreasonably high. Therefore, they may be used as a guideline, 
provided however, that each case of moral harm is given an 
individual assessment, with regard to the facts of the case. This is, 
of course, a quite Solomonic solution. On the facts, the Supreme 
Court raised the non-pecuniary damages for a nineteen-year-old 
victim of a car accident to PLN 550,000 ($180,000), (the victim 
demanded PLN 1,000,000 for extremely severe brain injuries 
causing permanent physical and mental damage, and 100% 
disability.77 
C. Non-Pecuniary Loss in Wrongful Death Cases 
The close persons (victims par ricochet) are entitled to 
compensation of the moral damage arising from the victim’s death 
(art. 446 § 4 of k.c.). The bereavement claim was introduced by the 
revision of the Civil Code on May 30, 2008.78 Since then a major 
theme in personal injury jurisprudence has been the problem of 
compensating moral harm of family members of the deceased 
when the death happened before August 3, 2008. It should be 
noted that the legislature did not introduce any special 
intertemporal provisions in the revision of 2008, hence the regular 
rules of intertemporal law apply (in particular, the tempus regit 
actum rule). 
                                                                                                             
 76. OSNC ZD C/2010, item 80. 
 77. A similar sum of damages was granted to a widow for the deterioration 
of her life due to the death of her husband in a car accident on the basis of article 
446 §3 k.c. See SN judgment of 14 March 2007, I CSK 465/06, OSP 11/2008, 
item 123. On remand the Court of Appeals awarded PLN 500,000 with interest, 
which made a total of PLN 1 million. The average awards in similar cases hover 
around PLN 200,000 ($66,000). 
 78. Act of 30 May 2008, Dz.U. 2008, no. 116, item 731. 
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In the case of January 14, 2010 (IV CSK 307/09)79 the 
Supreme Court allowed bereavement damages to be pursued on the 
basis of the violation of the personal right to family ties (art. 24 in 
conjunction with art. 448 k.c.). Such a construction of articles 24 
and 448 k.c. has caused a vast flow of claims arising from events 
that happened prior to August 3, 2008, in particular in the light of 
the Court’s recent liberal approach to accumulation of claims for 
compensation of non-pecuniary loss on the basis of article 448 
k.c.80 The scenario almost exclusively involves death arising from 
a traffic accident. The idea of making use of the provisions 
regulating the protection of personal rights in order to create a 
ground for awarding compensation for the moral damage arising 
from the victim’s death was first applied shortly before 2008 in a 
few judgments of the courts of appeal.81 In fact, this trend in case 
law contributed to the legislative change in 2008. The protection of 
personal rights as a legal ground for such claims was, however, 
called into question by scholars. Since the revision of the civil code 
in 2008, the common opinion is that indirectly injured persons 
have finally been vested with a right to seek redress of moral harm 
arising from the death of a family member.  
Nevertheless, since 2010 the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that a “special family tie between the living persons” may be 
violated by wrongfully causing death to one of the family 
members.82 The catalogue of the interests included in article 23 
                                                                                                             
 79. OSNC-ZD C/2010, item 91; Bagińska, Poland (2010), supra note 49, at 
467-70, nos. 52-59. 
 80. SN judgment of 9 September 2008, III CZP 31/08, OSNC 3/2009, item 
36, reported in Bagińska, Poland (2009), supra note 46, at 488-90, nos. 42–50. 
 81. SA in Gdańsk judgment of 23 September 2005, I ACa 554/05, 9-10 
PALESTRA 308 (2006); SA in Gdańsk judgment of 14 December 2007, I ACa 
1137/07 (unpublished).  
 82. See SN judgment of 21 October 2010, III CZP 76/10, OSP 9/2011, 
item 96; SN judgment of 10 November 2010, II CSK 248/10, OSNC-ZD 
B/2011, item 44; SN judgment of 3 June 2011, III CSK 279/10; Bagińska, 
Poland (2011), supra note 52, at 493-97, nos. 13-26; similarly, also in SN 
judgment of 13 July 2011, III CZP 32/11 (unpublished); SN judgment of 15 
March 2012, I CSK 314/11 (unpublished); SN judgment of 7 November 2012, 
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k.c. is open-ended and the Supreme Court found no reason to 
exclude emotional family ties from the sphere of legal protection.  
It is hard to contest the Court’s argument referring to unequal 
treatment of claimants. Without question, those victims who were 
“unlucky enough” to lose their next-of-kin before August 3, 2008 
are “discriminated” against by the system. They form a substantial 
group of actual and future claimants. Why are they to be treated 
differently with respect to entitlement to bereavement claims than 
those who lost their relative after August 3, 2008? From the 
constitutional perspective, such a situation is unacceptable. On the 
other hand, the tempus regit actum rule was not modified by the 
legislature and it has to be applied. This policy decision is now 
attenuated by the refreshed construction of the provision of article 
448 k.c. in the shape it has existed in since 1996.83 According to 
the Court, the fact that indirect victims were finally vested with a 
right to claim bereavement damages in 2008 does not mean that 
they had been prevented from seeking compensation pursuant to 
the rules on the protection of personal interests before that date. In 
the Court’s view, the legislative change only confirmed the 
admissibility of compensatory claims based on the protection of 
personality rights.  
That entirely new interpretation was created and maintained in 
the context of the indemnity paid under third party liability motor 
insurance,84 as the scope of guarantee liability of an insurer is 
identical (albeit capped) to the scope of civil liability of the insured 
towards any victim. In all cases where the Supreme Court equated 
the civil liability for wrongful death with the violation of a 
personality right (i.e., a special emotional family tie), the 
                                                                                                             
 
III CZP 67/12, OSN IC 4/2013, item 45; SN judgment of 20 December 2012, III 
CZP 93/12, OSN IC 7-8/2013, item 84. 
 83. See Bagińska, Poland (2010), supra note 49, at 468-69, nos. 56-58. 
 84. See article 38 of the Law on Compulsory Insurance, Insurance 
Guarantee Fund and Polish Motor insurers’ Bureau, Act of 22 May 2003, Dz.U. 
2003, no. 124, item 1152, with amendments. 
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defendant, sued directly by the next-of-kin, was a third party traffic 
liability insurer, whose liability has a cap of €5 million (until June 
10, 2012, the cap was €2.5 million). Nevertheless, in no single case 
can one find any overt policy argument indicating that the insurers’ 
deep pockets had a great impact on the ruling. A similar decision 
against a “normal” defendant (e.g., against a doctor for medical 
malpractice which resulted in death, or a recourse claim of the 
insurer towards a drunken driver) has not yet been reported.85 It 
ought to be noted that this case law, despite meaningful criticism in 
legal writings, is well established.  
From a practical angle, pursuing “old” cases, where the claims 
have not yet expired, has become a huge problem for the insurance 
sector. Most of the cases from before August 2008 were adjusted 
and paid out to the claimants—next-of-kins. Hence, now insurers 
face the necessity of safeguarding millions of Polish zlotys to 
cover the claims grounded in the theory of an infringement of a 
new personality interest. The average award ranks between PLN 
100,000 and 120,000 ($33,000–40,000), but not infrequently the 
sums reach the ceiling of $120,000. This higher level of 
compensation reflects the sums paid by the Polish government to 
the members of families of the victims of a governmental plane 
crash in Smolensk (Russia) in 2010, in which 98 persons were 
killed. The sum of PLN 300,000 ($100,000) is also a maximal cap 
in the new system of seeking compensation for losses due to 
medical incidents in the event of a patient’s death (discussed 
below). 
Finally, a victim-oriented approach also concerns the scope of 
entitlement to bereavement damages. In a landmark decision of 
March 9, 2012 (I CSK 282/11),86 the Supreme Court has extended 
the understanding of the “next-of-kins” who may claim non-
                                                                                                             
 85. See Ewa Bagińska & Izabela Adrych-Brzezińska, Poland in EUROPEAN 
TORT LAW 2013 at 510-13, nos. 88, 90-92 (E. Karner & B.C. Steininger eds., De 
Gruyter 2014) [hereinafter Poland (2013)].  
 86. OSP 11/2012, item 106; Bagińska & Krupa-Lipińska, Poland (2012), 
supra note 68, at 539-42, nos. 59-71. 
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pecuniary compensation on the basis of article 446 § 4 k.c. The 
Supreme Court ruled that a baby who is stillborn may be declared a 
descendant according to the said provision. In this case, a baby was 
stillborn due to the injuries that its mother suffered in a car 
accident. At the time of the accident, the mother was in her 34th 
week of pregnancy and the fetus was a viable baby that could have 
lived outside the womb. Due to the loss of the baby, its parents 
suffered bereavement; the mother was traumatized, not able to 
work, and taking psychotropic medication. She claimed PLN 
150,000 ($50,000) and the father PLN 100,000 ($33,000) as 
bereavement damages. The Supreme Court awarded compensation 
holding that an unborn baby might be considered as next-of-kin 
under a factual test. Hence, it should be established in each case 
whether strong, positive and deep emotional bonds existed 
between the plaintiffs and the deceased—that is, whether it was an 
expected and wanted baby. It was the first time that the Supreme 
Court awarded non-pecuniary damages for parents as secondary 
victims who have had a stillborn baby. In 1966 the Supreme Court 
considered an opposite situation: whether a baby might claim for 
bereavement damages as a secondary victim if it was in its 
mother’s womb at the time of the death of its father. The court then 
answered in the affirmative.87 The decision of March 2012 has 
been criticized in legal academic writings.88 According to 
Mirosław Nesterowicz, the final result (the award of bereavement 
damages) is correct and just, but the legal reasoning of the Court is 
wrong: the parents’ claims should have been classified as those of 
primary victims (on the basis of art. 445 § 1 k.c.), as they had 
                                                                                                             
 87. SN judgment of 4 April 1966, II PR 139/66, OSPIKA 12/1966, item 
279. The case was based on article 166 of the Code of Obligations (1933), which 
was equivalent to article 446 § 4 k.c. 
 88. See Mirosław Nesterowicz, Dziedziczenie roszczenia o 
zadośćuczynienie za krzywdę wyrządzoną dziecku w łonie matki. Glosa do 
wyroku SN z 24 marca 2011 r. (I CSK 389/10) [Inheritance claims for 
compensation for the harm done to the child in the womb. Commentary on the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 March 2011. (I CSK 389/10)], 7 
PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY 197 (2012); see also cmt by Bączyk-Rozwadowska, OSP 
11/2012, item 106. 
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suffered moral damage (physical and mental pain) due to the death 
of their unborn baby, and not as those of secondary victims (on the 
basis of art. 446 § 4 k.c.). To justify its decision, the Supreme 
Court pointed to the distinction between the terms “injured” and 
“deceased” used in article 446 k.c. Some commentators approve of 
this as the correct approach, coherent with the ratio legis of the 
Code provision, which implies that a deceased person does not 
need to have legal capacity.89 Others argue that the term 
“deceased” used in the article is a logical consequence of the 
regulatory scheme in articles 444-446 k.c.: articles 444–445 k.c. 
concern claims of a primary victim, while article 446 k.c. concerns 
claims of an indirectly injured person, resulting from the death of 
the primary victim.90 To be classified as “deceased”, however, the 
baby needs to live at least for a moment.  
V. THE REFORM OF THE RULES ON CLAIMS PRESCRIPTION IN 
PERSONAL INJURY CASES91 
Until recently tort claims were limited to three years from the 
date that the victim learned of the damage and the person 
responsible, but in any case to ten years since the tort occurred (art. 
442 §1 k.c.). The key practical problem was compensating 
personal injuries stemming from events that took place more than 
ten years before the occurrence of the damage. Lower courts had 
tackled this problem differently, following the grammatical 
construction of article 442 §1 k.c., although the case law was 
largely inconsistent. In the Resolution of the Full Civil Chamber of 
                                                                                                             
 89. See cmt by Bączyk-Rozwadowska, supra note 88, at 749. 
 90. See Nesterowicz, supra note 88, at 108. 
 91. In Polish law prescription of claims does not result in the termination of 
a right. The right (claim) survives the lapse of time, but the debtor, when sued, 
may raise a defence of limitation of action and the court will thus dismiss the 
claim (i.e., the claim is time-barred). Should the debtor not raise the defence, the 
court will enforce the claim, as it has no competence to apply the statute of 
limitations ex officio. 
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February 17, 2006,92 the Supreme Court held that the maximum 
ten-year period must always be counted from the day of the tort (a 
tempore facti), and not from the day of the awareness of the 
damage. This interpretation applied equally to future losses and to 
losses that the victim was unaware of. When construing article 442 
§1 k.c., no reference should be made to the notion of “accrual of 
claims.” This judgment preceded the ruling of the Constitutional 
Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucujny or TK). The Constitutional 
Tribunal, in the judgment of 1 September 2006 (SK 14/05), 
declared that the situation where some claims may be limited in 
time before the victim is even aware of the damage was 
unconstitutional.93 The Tribunal thus repealed article 442 §1 
sentence 2 k.c. because of its unconstitutionality.94  
Consequently, the rules on prescription of tort claims placed in 
the Title on Torts were modified in 2007 by the Act of 16 February 
2007 on the Revision of the Civil Code.95 Pursuant to the new 
article 442[1] §1 k.c., a claim for redress of damage caused by a 
tort shall be barred after a period of three years from the date on 
which the injured person learned of the damage and about the 
person obliged to redress it. However, this period cannot extend 
beyond ten years from the date on which the event causing damage 
occurred. This means that the three-year period stops running after 
ten years from the day of the tort. The ten-year period must always 
be counted from the day of the tort (a tempore facti), and not from 
the day of the awareness of the damage (a tempore scientiae). 
                                                                                                             
 92. III CZP 84/05, OSN 7–8/2006, item 114; Ewa Bagińska, Poland in 
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2006 at 389-90, nos. 75-82 (H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger 
eds., Springer 2008) [hereinafter Poland (2006)]. 
 93. TK judgment of 1 September 2006, 14/05, OTK, A- 2006, no. 8, item 
97; Bagińska, Poland (2006), supra note 92, at 389-92, nos. 83-90. 
 94. Article 442 k.c. originated in the 1933 Code of Obligations, and despite 
strong criticism has not been changed with the exception of shortening of the 
prescription period from twenty to ten years in 1950. 
 95. Dz.U. 2007, no. 80, item 538; see Bagińska, Poland (2007), supra note 
60, at 451-52, nos. 1-5. The revision did not modify the interpretation of Article 
449[8] k.c.—the special rule on prescription in the product liability regime 
which must be construed in conformity with Product Liability Directive 
85/374/EEC. 
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Pursuant to article 442[1] §2 k.c., if damage resulted from a crime 
or misdemeanour, compensation claims are barred after a period of 
twenty years from the date when the crime or misdemeanour was 
committed, regardless of when the person who suffered the 
damage learned about it and about the person obliged to redress it. 
A new rule stipulates that a personal injury claim cannot expire 
before the lapse of three years from the day on which the injured 
person learned about the injury and about the person obliged to 
redress it (art. 442[1] §3 k.c.). This means that regardless of the 
lapse of the time a tempore facti, whether ten or twenty years, the 
claim arising from personal injury will not be time-barred for three 
years since tempore scientiae. Hence, the absolute periods of ten or 
twenty years are “suspended” in personal injury cases. 
Nevertheless, the periods running a tempore facti may remain 
more convenient for the injured party with regard to evidentiary 
burdens. 
Finally, the claims of minors for redress of personal injury may 
not expire earlier than two years from the day when they reached 
maturity.96 
Under the new regime on prescription, the ‘suspension’ of the 
period of prescription in personal injury cases (art. 442[1] §3 k.c.) 
does not preclude obtaining a declaratory judgment that the 
defendant is liable for any future damage originating from the 
same event (tort). The Supreme Court, in the ruling of February 24, 
2009,97 held that the amendment of the Civil Code had not caused 
a substantial difference in this respect as compared to the former 
regime.98 Damage caused by injury to persons is dynamic and the 
consequences of tortious conduct may appear long after the event. 
The rule stated above performs two functions. First of all, it 
enables the injured person to claim compensation for distant 
                                                                                                             
 96. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 127-29, nos. 228-30. 
 97. III CZP 2/09, OSNC 12/2009, item 168; Bagińska, Poland (2009), 
supra note 46, at 486-88, nos. 34-41. 
 98. This was well-established case law under the former regime; see SN 
judgment of 17 April 1970, III PZP 34/69 OSNCP 12/1970, item 217. 
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consequences of a tort. The second aim is to facilitate the burden 
of proving all conditions of liability for those consequences. 
Therefore, an injured person has, in principle, legal standing to ask 
for a declaratory judgment if she pursues her interest 
simultaneously with a claim for actual damages. 
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL 
INJURY CASES  
A. Group Actions Law  
In 2010 the legislature introduced class (group) actions into 
Polish law.99 A class action may only be brought with respect to 
claims for consumer protection, claims based on product liability 
and claims based on tort law (except for claims for protection of 
personal interests).100 A class action is allowed where single-type 
claims are asserted by at least ten persons and are based on the 
same facts or on the same legal bases, provided that material 
circumstances that substantiate the claim are common for all the 
claims. There is no maximum limit of claimants. However, with 
regard to claims for payment of money, all the group’s members 
have to agree on the unified amount per person being claimed. 
Diversified amounts are still possible, provided that they are settled 
within subgroups of at least two persons. This requirement entails 
a detraction from the idea of full compensation and is rather 
uncommon among other class action models. Some class members 
will need to modify their claims and adjust them to the amounts 
claimed by other class members. In practice, this means decreasing 
the claim amount to the level of the lowest in the class or sub-
                                                                                                             
 99. Law on Pursuing Claims in Group Proceedings, Act of 17 December 
2009, Dz.U. 2010, no. 7, item 44; in force since July 18, 2010. 
 100. The distinction of product liability claims from tort claims is artificial. 
A product liability claim is a tort claim under Polish law. Perhaps it is due to the 
fact that torts are regulated in Chapter VI and the product liability regime in 
Chapter VI prim of Book Three of the Civil Code. Chapter VI prim 
implemented the EU Directive 374/85/EC (it was technically more convenient to 
create an additional chapter in the code).  
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group, because courts will not award compensation above the 
actual damage.101 
If claims are pecuniary, the plaintiffs may request that instead 
of demands for payment, the court establish the liability of the 
defendant (art. 2). It is an opt-in procedure. The claimants must be 
defined (not anonymous) and they have to make a declaration of 
willingness to participate in the class action before the court. The 
regime of a class action does not exclude the right to pursue 
individual claims under the general rules of civil procedure. 
Clearly, the aim of the new mechanism is to simplify and 
facilitate actions by large numbers of people seeking 
compensation. In spite of this attempt at approaching damages 
more “globally”, the Act does not detract from the main premise of 
compensatory rules: each class member is to be awarded damages 
individually. The first Polish class action suit was filed in a case of 
over 400 patients who were infected with the hepatitis C virus 
through the administration of a medication (the class is seeking 
approximately PLN 75 million = $25 million in damages) and is 
still ongoing. 
B. Alternative Route for Seeking Compensation for Personal Injury 
Arising from Hospital Medical Incidents102 
For the past 20 years Polish legal writers have strongly 
supported the introduction of an alternative compensatory scheme 
to deal with the large number of claims arising from health care 
services. Both the Swedish No-Fault Patient Insurance system of 
1975 (as amended in 1997) and the French model were suggested 
as best suited to Polish juridical, economic and social 
conditions.103 Such a special scheme would enhance, in particular, 
                                                                                                             
 101. See BAGIŃSKA & TULIBACKA, supra note 4, at 147-49, no. 276. 
 102. See generally Ewa Bagińska, The New Extra-Judicial Compensation 
System for Victims of Medical Malpractice and Accidents in Poland, 3 JOURNAL 
OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW (JETL) 101 (2012).  
 103. See KINGA BĄCZYK-ROZWADOWSKA, ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ CYWILNA ZA 
SZKODY WYRZĄDZONE PRZY LECZENIU [LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES FOR 
350 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 8 
 
 
 
the protection of victims of hospital infections, infections 
stemming from blood transfusions, medical accidents and 
vaccinations.104 It is beyond doubt that such high awards have 
rendered budget management by public hospitals problematic.  
The Act of 28 April 2011, on the Revision of the Law on 
Patients’ Rights and the Patients’ Ombudsman, introduced a new, 
extra-judicial procedure for patients’ personal injury claims arising 
from a medical incident.105 This procedure aims to enable hospital 
patients to seek compensation relatively swiftly directly from the 
insurer (or from the hospital, if the insurance coverage is 
unavailable). The subject matter of the procedure is the 
establishment of a “medical incident” for which a hospital is liable. 
The hospital’s liability is still considered a civil liability for 
medical malpractice or a medical accident. However, the 
compensation available via this legal pathway is capped. 
Concurrently, a new Law on Healthcare Activity106 obliged all 
healthcare entities that manage hospitals to obtain patient insurance 
against damages caused by medical incidents.  
This extra-judicial, administrative (or quasi-administrative) 
system is based on sixteen regional medical boards (commissions). 
The boards consist of sixteen lawyers and physicians in equal 
numbers. They are appointed by the Ministry of Health (one 
member), the Patients’ Ombudsman (one member), and the head of 
a region (fourteen members) from the candidates recommended by 
professional corporations and patients’ organisations active in a 
given region. 
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A patient, or his or her statutory representative or heirs, may 
file a claim. The process of seeking redress through a medical 
complaints board is not synonymous with contemporary forms of 
alternative dispute resolution. The procedure is neither arbitration 
nor mediation because the patient may commence the proceedings 
without the consent of the other party. The legislature thus 
describes the procedure as alternative, because a patient has a 
choice: he or she can either follow this procedure, taking his or her 
matter before a regional board and agreeing to the proposal made 
by the responding insurer (or hospital), or take his or her claim 
through the general court system. The legislation does not provide 
for any judicial control over the decisions of medical boards or the 
compensation proposals made by the insurers. 
The Act introduced the first domestic statutory caps on 
damages in personal injury cases: the maximum cap of PLN 
100,000 ($33,000) for personal injury, and PLN 300,000 
($100,000) in the case of a patient’s death. The Ministerial 
Regulation of February 10, 2012,107 concerning the scope and 
conditions of evaluation of compensation for a medical incident 
provided tables for personal injuries and sub-caps in the case of a 
patient’s death: PLN 200,000 ($66,000) for pecuniary losses of the 
successors, and a maximum of PLN 100,000 ($33,000) as non-
pecuniary loss damages. More specific tables are also included. 
Insurers are required to refer to the tables when making an offer of 
compensation in the special procedure. 
These is serious criticism as to the inconsistencies between the 
Act and the civil code, the establishment of compensation caps that 
are either too low or too high, or the unreasonably limited scope of 
application of the procedure. The nature of the procedure also 
raises serious constitutional questions. This notwithstanding, the 
general direction of the new law appears to meet the expectations 
of both legal and social actors. In Poland, more than 60% of all 
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persons infected with the Hepatitis B virus (including 
approximately 80% of children under two years old) were infected 
in a health care institution. The second common source of injury is 
related to childbirth: between 2001 and 2009, approximately 330 
lawsuits annually were brought to court.108 However, many more 
cases, especially those involving full or partial disability following 
a hospital-related injury, were in fact handled within the 
framework of the social security system. This means that a 
substantial number of injured patients were either uncompensated 
or under compensated. The system has been in operation for two 
years and patients have been successful in approximately 25% of 
the cases filed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of Polish tort law in the last two decades clearly 
shows that—contrary to what was argued in the previous political 
system—money damages can play an important social function. 
They supplement the social benefits paid out from the (public) 
social security system as well as the public health care system. 
Damages for non-pecuniary loss aim to compensate victims, as far 
as money can, for moral harm. In general, in the present practice 
the sums awarded by Polish courts as compensation for non-
pecuniary loss are increasingly high. In certain cases this is the 
only type of damages received by the victim. Although the awards 
adjudicated by Polish courts may seem relatively insignificant to 
American readers, especially when compared with amounts 
awarded for similar injuries in the U.S., they have sufficient 
buying power in Poland. The emphasis on the compensatory 
function has led to the rejection of “moderate” sums or “average 
standard of living” as an additional yardstick for computing the 
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award. This is one of the most important developments in the court 
practice in the last decade.  
The other important development is the explicit basis for 
bereavement damages. It has immediately led to a change in the 
courts’ interpretation of the already-existing rules on personal 
rights protection in order to ameliorate the lacuna caused by the 
failure of the legislature to embrace existing, yet unexpired, claims 
of the next-of-kins. 
Another significant legislative reform, brought about by a 
decision by the Constitutional Tribunal, relates to the extension of, 
as well as substantial modification in, computing the prescription 
periods in personal injury cases. The new procedural instruments 
that have been made available to the victims remain to be assessed. 
The alternative path for victims of medical incidents seems to have 
become popular with patients, in contrast to group actions.  
